<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Stanley McChrystal on SummaryShelf</title><link>https://summaryshelf.app/authors/stanley-mcchrystal/</link><description>Recent content in Stanley McChrystal on SummaryShelf</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://summaryshelf.app/authors/stanley-mcchrystal/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World</title><link>https://summaryshelf.app/team-of-teams/</link><pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://summaryshelf.app/team-of-teams/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Efficiency was the wrong thing to be good at. That is the finding underneath &lt;em&gt;Team of Teams&lt;/em&gt;, and Stanley McChrystal paid for it in the field. He took command of the Joint Special Operations Command in October 2003, and the task force it ran in Iraq had the best-trained, best-equipped force on the ground and lost ground anyway to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had none of those advantages. His people won nearly every engagement they fought. The war went the other way regardless.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>