<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Andrew Ross Sorkin on SummaryShelf</title><link>https://summaryshelf.app/authors/andrew-ross-sorkin/</link><description>Recent content in Andrew Ross Sorkin on SummaryShelf</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://summaryshelf.app/authors/andrew-ross-sorkin/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>1929</title><link>https://summaryshelf.app/1929/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://summaryshelf.app/1929/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Debt runs underneath every financial collapse, and 1929 is the clearest case study we have. Through the boom years, ordinary Americans bought cars, radios, and stocks the same way—on credit—and the country&amp;rsquo;s most trusted bankers didn&amp;rsquo;t just permit it. They built the machine, greased it, and talked people into climbing aboard. When the market finally broke that October, the men who had profited most spent years insisting it was nobody&amp;rsquo;s fault, until a Senate prosecutor proved otherwise and Congress rewrote the rules of American banking.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>